

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Background: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy for agriculture, medicine, and power generation. In 1970, the agency took on the role of watchdog for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with global responsibility for inspecting non-nuclear weapon state nuclear facilities to assure that nuclear materials are not being misused or diverted to weapons production.



As an intergovernmental organization, the IAEA is a source of technical expertise on nuclear facilities and research and can create rules (such as inspections) with the support and consent of its members. It relies, however, on its member countries to provide the money to implement these rules. In political terms, the authority of the IAEA rests only on the strength of its members and their willingness to work together.

As the “watchdog” for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA is keenly aware of ALL of the treaty’s requirements outlined below:

1. It is the IAEA’s job to provide assurances that Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) such as Aggravalia and Terranova are not attempting to gain a nuclear weapon.
2. The NPT acknowledges the “inalienable right” of all states to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes.
3. The NPT commits the United States and Landesia to engage in good faith efforts to reduce their own nuclear stockpiles (though the IAEA has no role in monitoring that commitment).
4. The NPT establishes the terms by which a state (such as Aggravalia) may withdraw from the treaty. This requires three months advance notice should “extraordinary events” jeopardize its supreme national interests. Since North Korea’s announced withdrawal (the first to occur under the treaty) member-states have discussed ways to discourage future withdrawals, but have been unable to find consensus.

Aggravalia has a functioning uranium mine and extensive reserves of the mineral. Its nuclear technology infrastructure, however, is quite weak. While the IAEA has been working with Aggravalia to develop its capacity to establish a nuclear power program, it has become clear that purchasing hydropower from Terranova would be a better, faster way to meet the country’s energy needs.

In the meantime, Aggravalia’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear research facilities exacerbates international tension; it creates the impression (rightly or wrongly) that Aggravalia wants to build a bomb. There is an Additional Protocol to the NPT designed to help the IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear activities. If Aggravalia agreed to accept the additional protocol, it would give the IAEA access to Aggravalia’s mines. This could be an effective confidence-building measure in a tense international situation.

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Opening Statement: The IAEA Director General has instructed your delegation to negotiate with all stakeholders, although you may find that some of the other groups do not want to negotiate with each other. You are to take the following opening position:

- The IAEA is concerned with Aggravalia's refusal to allow inspectors into its nuclear research facilities.
- As a member of the NPT, Aggravalia has an obligation to not pursue nuclear weapons.
- Aggravalian withdrawal from the NPT would threaten regional peace and security. The IAEA needs to immediately return to inspect Aggravalian nuclear facilities in order to de-escalate international tensions.
- The only solution to this problem is to allow the IAEA access to all Aggravalian nuclear facilities as stipulated under the NPT.

